| ID | 165260 |
| Title Proper | Hedging for Better Bets |
| Other Title Information | Power Shifts, Credible Signals, and Preventive Conflict |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Yoder, Brandon K |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | How can declining states reliably infer the intentions of rising states? One prominent line of argument maintains that because declining states face intractable uncertainty about rising states’ future intentions, preventive war is often unavoidable even between states with truly compatible goals. This article presents a dynamic model of reassurance in which actors are uncertain whether or not their interests conflict. The model shows that by adopting a hedging strategy of limited containment short of war, declining states can reduce risers’ incentives to send dishonest cooperative signals. This, in turn, makes cooperation more credible as a signal of risers’ benign intentions. Moreover, these signals are sufficiently informative to dissuade the decliner from escalating to preventive war even under large power shifts. Thus, although power shifts promote limited competition among states with compatible goals, preventive war rationally occurs only in a bargaining context when the riser’s goals are known to be incompatible. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 63, No.4; Apr 2019: p.923-949 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol: 63 No 4 |
| Key Words | Conflict ; Game Theory ; Cooperation ; Bargaining ; Capabilities ; Belief Structure ; Power Transition Theory ; Foreign Policy |