| ID | 165410 |
| Title Proper | Candidate entry and political polarization |
| Other Title Information | an experimental study |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | GROßER, JENS |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | We report the results of a laboratory experiment based on a citizen–candidate model with private information about ideal points. Inefficient political polarization is observed in all treatments; that is, citizens with extreme ideal points enter as candidates more often than moderate citizens. Second, less entry occurs, with even greater polarization, when voters have directional information about candidates’ ideal points, using ideological party labels. Nonetheless, this directional information is welfare enhancing because the inefficiency from greater polarization is outweighed by lower entry expenses and better voter information. Third, entry rates are decreasing in group size and the entry cost. These findings are all implied by properties of the unique symmetric Bayesian equilibrium cutpoint pair of the entry game. Quantitatively, we observe too little (too much) entry when the theoretical entry rates are high (low). This general pattern of observed biases in entry rates is implied by logit quantal response equilibrium. |
| `In' analytical Note | American Political Science Review Vol. 113, No.1; Feb 2019: p.209-225 |
| Journal Source | American Political Science Review 2019-03 113, 1 |
| Key Words | Political Polarization ; Candidate Entry |