| ID | 165748 |
| Title Proper | Buying Allies |
| Other Title Information | Payment Practices in Multilateral Military Coalition-Building |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Henke, Marina E |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Many countries serving in multilateral military coalitions are “paid” to do so, either in cash or in concessions relating to other international issues. An examination of hundreds of declassified archival sources as well as elite interviews relating to the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Iraq War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization operation in Afghanistan, the United Nations–African Union operation in Darfur, and the African Union operation in Somalia reveals that these payment practices follow a systematic pattern: pivotal states provide the means to cover such payments. These states reason that rewarding third parties to serve in multilateral coalitions holds important political benefits. Moreover, two distinct types of payment schemes exist: deployment subsidies and political side deals. Three types of states are most likely to receive such payments: (1) states that are inadequately resourced to deploy; (2) states that are perceived by the pivotal states as critical contributors to the coalition endeavor; and (3) opportunistic states that perceive a coalition deployment as an opportunity to negotiate a quid pro quo. These findings provide a novel perspective on what international burden sharing looks like in practice. Moreover, they raise important questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of such payment practices in multilateral military deployments. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Security Vol. 43, No.4; Spring 2019: p.128-162 |
| Journal Source | International Security Vol: 43 No 4 |
| Key Words | Multilateral Military Coalitions ; Multilateral Military Coalition-Building |