| ID | 166863 |
| Title Proper | Reactor-grade plutonium and nuclear weapons |
| Other Title Information | ending the debate |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Jones, Gregory S |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The claim that reactor-grade plutonium cannot or will not be used to produce nuclear weapons has been used to justify non-nuclear-weapon states’ large stockpiles of plutonium that has been separated from highly radioactive spent fuel. However, by using reduced-mass plutonium cores, it is possible to manufacture reliable nuclear weapons with reactor-grade plutonium. These weapons can have the same design, size, weight, and predetonation probability as weapons using weapon-grade plutonium and would require no special cooling. The increased radiation from reactor-grade plutonium could be easily managed by shielding and operational procedures. Weapons using plutonium routinely produced by pressurized-water reactors could have a lethal area between 40 percent and 75 percent that of weapons using weapon-grade plutonium. In the past, both Sweden and Pakistan considered using reactor-grade plutonium to produce nuclear weapons, and India may be using reactor-grade plutonium in its arsenal today. Despite claims to the contrary, the United States used what was truly reactor-grade plutonium in a successful nuclear test in 1962. The capability of reactor-grade plutonium to produce highly destructive nuclear weapons leads to the conclusion that the separation of plutonium, plutonium stockpiling, and the use of plutonium-based fuels must be phased out and banned. |
| `In' analytical Note | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 26, No.1-2; Feb-Mar 2019: p.61-81 |
| Journal Source | Nonproliferation Review Vol: 26 No 1-2 |
| Key Words | proliferation ; Plutonium ; Highly Enriched Uranium ; Fissile Materials ; Civil Nuclear-Power Programs |