| ID | 167286 |
| Title Proper | Conflict negotiations and rebel leader selection |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The international community often calls for negotiations in civil wars. Yet, we have limited understanding of when and why specific rebels enter into negotiations. The emergence of a new leader in a rebel group can provide an opportunity for the state seeking to end war, but this is conditional on how leaders take power. Rebel leaders who come to power through a local selection process (such as an election) provide information to the state about the likely cohesion of the rebel group. This affects state perceptions of the viability of a rebel group as a bargaining partner in civil war negotiations. Using original data on rebel leaders in civil wars, we show that new leaders coming to power through a local selection process are more likely to get to the negotiating table than leaders coming to power in other ways. We find that the election of a rebel group leader has a particularly strong and positive effect on the chance of getting to the table. Rebel leaders that founded their own group or brought together disparate rebels to create a single group are less likely to get to the negotiating table. This article advances our understanding of conflict dynamics by offering a novel argument of rebel leader ascension and its impact on conflict bargaining and has critical implications for parties external to the conflict interested in conflict resolution. External actors seeking to facilitate lasting peace may benefit from observing patterns of rebel leadership. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Peace Research Vol. 56, No.5; Sep 2019: p.619-634 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Peace Research Vol: 56 No 5 |
| Key Words | Conflict Resolution ; Civil War ; Rebel Leaders |