| ID | 167453 |
| Title Proper | Negotiating with Two Hands Tied |
| Other Title Information | Fragmented Decision Processes and Concessions in Civil Wars |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Urlacher, Brian R |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Theories of conflict resolution often posit unified actors as a simplifying assumption. In practice conflict actors often struggle to balance competing factions and centers of power. Schelling and Putnam have argued that factors that constrain what a negotiator can accept are a potential source of leverage in a bargaining process, yet a counter argument suggests that leaders seeking to negotiate, while facing divided government, may be less able to credibly signal their intentions. Drawing on event data from nearly 3,000 conflict-months, this paper analyzes the frequency of concessions offered by both rebels and governments. This study finds evidence that a fractured decision-process results in both rebels and governments making more concessions. Further corroboration is provided through a case study of the Philippine government’s efforts to negotiate an end to the conflict in the Mindanao region. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Negotiation Vol. 24, No.3; 2019: p.464-92 |
| Journal Source | International Negotiation Vol: 24 No 3 |
| Key Words | Concessions ; Bargaining Theory ; Mindanao Conflict ; Civil War ; Paradox Of Weakness |