| ID | 167783 |
| Title Proper | Dargo Expedition of 1845 |
| Other Title Information | Lessons Learned and Unlearned |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Statiev, Alexander |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article examines the Dargo expedition, an episode of the Caucasus War waged in 1817–1864 by Russia against the tribes of the North Caucasus. In 1845, Tsar Nicholas I ordered a raid in the depth of the mountains controlled by rebels led by imam Shamil. The expedition, targeting the village of Dargo, Shamil’s residence, was to lure the tribesmen into a decisive battle, which the Russians were expected to win and thus destroy the protracted insurgency. However, the expedition ended in a spectacular failure, because its planners ignored the challenges of mountain warfare. The article focuses on these challenges and shows how the rebels’ skill in mountain warfare triumphed over the great superiority in numbers, firepower, and discipline enjoyed by the Russians. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol. 32, No.2; Apr-Jun 2019: p.210-234 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol: 32 No 2 |
| Key Words | North Caucasus ; Dargo Expedition of 1845 |