| ID | 167787 |
| Title Proper | Introduction to the special section on the 1967 Middle East War |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Cohen, Avner ; Pollack, Joshua H |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Public understanding of the nuclear dimensions of the June 1967 Middle East War has progressed considerably since the late 1990s. Then, Israeli researchers showed that the vulnerability of Israel’s nuclear facility at Dimona to Egyptian air power played a significant role in the thinking of Israel’s military and political leaders during the crisis of May and early June. This issue’s special section offers significant new advances in addressing unresolved questions about the role of Israel’s nuclear program during these events. Did Egypt’s leaders actually have designs on Dimona, and how did their thinking about Dimona change over the course of the crisis? How close was Israel to possessing a usable nuclear device on the war’s eve? In what manner and circumstances might Israel have detonated its nuclear device? Did the US government know or suspect that Israel had an underground reprocessing plant adjacent to the Dimona reactor, enabling it to separate plutonium and build nuclear devices? |
| `In' analytical Note | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 25, No.5-6; Nov-Dec 2018: p.5-6 |
| Journal Source | Nonproliferation Review Vol: 25 No 5-6 |
| Key Words | 1967 ; Middle East War |