| ID | 167793 |
| Title Proper | Managing Indian deterrence |
| Other Title Information | pressures on credible minimum deterrence and nuclear policy options |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | O'Donnell, Frank |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | India is developing new nuclear force options in response to what it perceives as a deteriorating strategic environment. New Delhi has historically adhered to the nuclear strategic concept of “credible minimum deterrence,” defined as maintaining a small, survivable nuclear force at low readiness in peacetime, which poses a credible risk of nuclear retaliation to adversaries but does not guarantee it. However, India’s stated commitment to credible minimum deterrence is currently challenged by four specific developments: the gradual weakening of elite support for India’s no-first-use policy; the decision of its defense scientific agency to pressure policy makers by publicly announcing it can field tactical nuclear weapons; the shift of Indian Air Force planning toward potential counterforce strikes; and New Delhi’s unclear intentions concerning ballistic-missile defense. This article concludes that India faces a choice between two distinct nuclear-policy pathways: retaining its adherence to credible minimum deterrence, or permitting increasing ambiguity surrounding its true nuclear doctrine and posture. The article evaluates these nuclear-policy options and concludes that credible minimum deterrence remains more consistent with Indian national-security and foreign-policy goals. |
| `In' analytical Note | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 25, No.5-6; Nov-Dec 2018: p.419-436 |
| Journal Source | Nonproliferation Review Vol: 25 No 5-6 |
| Key Words | Deterrence ; India ; No First Use ; Assured Retaliation ; Ballistic-Missile Defense ; Credible Minimum Deterrence |