| ID | 168061 |
| Title Proper | Two-Level Games and the Policy Process |
| Other Title Information | Assessing Domestic–Foreign Policy Linkage Theory |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Noone, Harry |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | International relations scholars have struggled to adequately link domestic and international levels in theoretical models and causal analyses of foreign policy, despite widespread acknowledgment of the need to do so. This study elaborates on this challenge by assessing the utility of several policy process frameworks that have so far been underutilized in foreign policy analysis. The assumptions of one particularly fruitful method, the Two-Level Game, will be compared with those of three policy process frameworks: the Advocacy Coalition Framework, the Multiple Streams Framework, and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory. When analyzing three specific concepts (the question of rationality, the dynamics of agenda setting, and the strategic action of relevant actors), it is apparent that the assumptions of the policy process frameworks largely clash with those of the Two-Level Game, raising the potential for their augmentation of the field of foreign policy analysis despite their relative underuse. |
| `In' analytical Note | World Affairs US Vol.182, No.2; Summer 2019: p.165-186 |
| Journal Source | World Affairs US Vol: 182 No 2 |
| Key Words | International Relations Theory ; Two-Level Game ; Foreign Policy ; Domestic–Foreign Policy Linkage |