| ID | 168385 |
| Title Proper | Sympathy for the Devil: When and How to Negotiate with Criminal Gangs—Case of El Salvador |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Rahman, Eric |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Criminal gangs, while posing the most substantial threat to security in the Western hemisphere, fall outside the scope of contemporary studies in the field of mediation and negotiation. The prevailing wisdom that gangs are unmanageable due to their apolitical nature and the high political cost of dialogue has led to an approach that relies heavily on the security sector. While the security sector can and must play a role, confrontation alone has proven insufficient. The three-step theory presented in this article seeks to explain how and when to engage in dialogue as an alternative means of confronting criminal gangs. The success of this process, a reduction in violence and criminality through the transformation of gang-related conflict, hinges on sequencing and begins with state-sponsored mediation conducted in secret to establish a cease-fire between the gangs, then enters the phase of public negotiation between the state and the gangs, and finally concludes with a process of mainstreaming the reformed structures into society. This theory assumes that mediators can work with the gangs through a process of assisted articulation to develop a negotiating position, opening a zone of possible agreement between the government and the gangs. El Salvador offers a compelling example of how a society steeped in gang violence might pursue dialogue while also highlighting the threats posed to any negotiation. |
| `In' analytical Note | Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 42, No.10-12; Oct-Dec 2019: p.935-952 |
| Journal Source | Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol: 42 No 10-12 |
| Key Words | El Salvador ; Criminal Gangs |