| ID | 168521 |
| Title Proper | Partisan poll watchers and electoral manipulation |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | ASCENCIO, SERGIO J |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | How do parties protect themselves from electoral manipulation? To answer this question, we study the drivers of polling station party representatives’ presence and their impact on electoral outcomes in an environment where electoral irregularities are common. Using election data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, we find a robust positive correlation between the presence of party representatives and that party’s vote share. The evidence suggests that this correlation can be attributed to party representatives influencing the electoral results. We also formulate a game theoretic model of the levels of representation chosen by parties in a given precinct and structurally estimate its parameters. We find that parties send their representatives where they expect their opponents to send their own. The finding suggests representatives play a primarily protective role, even when they are often involved in irregularities themselves. |
| `In' analytical Note | American Political Science Review Vol. 113, No.3; Aug 2019: p.727-742 |
| Journal Source | American Political Science Review 2019-09 113, 3 |
| Key Words | Electoral Manipulation ; Partisan Poll Watchers |