| ID | 168535 |
| Title Proper | Investment in the Shadow of Conflict |
| Other Title Information | Globalization, Capital Control, and State Repression |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Shadmehr, Mehdi |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In conflict-prone societies, the fear of expropriation that accompanies a regime change reduces capital investment. These reductions in investments, in turn, harm the economy, amplifying the likelihood of regime change. This article studies the implications of these feedback channels on the interactions between globalization, capital control, state repression, and regime change. I show that processes that facilitate capital movements (e.g., globalization, economic modernization, and technologies that reduce transportation costs) amplify the likelihood of regime change in conflict-prone societies and strengthen the elite’s demand for a strong coercive state. In particular, to limit their collective action problem and manage the political risk of regime change, capitalists support a state that imposes capital control. We identify two conflicting forces, the Boix Effect and the Marx Effect, which determine when capital control and state repression become complements (Nazi Germany) or substitutes (Latin American military regimes) in right-wing regimes. |
| `In' analytical Note | American Political Science Review Vol. 113, No.4; Nov 2019: p.997-1011 |
| Journal Source | American Political Science Review 2019-12 113, 4 |
| Key Words | Globalization ; Capital control ; State Repression ; Investment in the Shadow of Conflict |