| ID | 169108 |
| Title Proper | Slow failure: Understanding America’s quagmire in Afghanistan |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kolenda, Christopher D |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The United States government has no organised way of thinking about war termination other than seeking decisive military victory. This implicit assumption is inducing three major errors. First, the United States tends to select military-centric strategies that have low probabilities of success. Second, the United States is slow to modify losing or ineffective strategies due to cognitive obstacles, internal frictions, and patron-client challenges with the host nation government. Finally, as the U.S. government tires of the war and elects to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries prevent successful transitions (building the host nation to win on its own) or negotiations. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 42, No.7; Dec 2019: p.992-1014 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol: 42 No 7 |
| Key Words | Counterinsurgency ; Afghanistan ; War termination ; Strategy ; Quagmire ; War Winning |