| ID | 169152 |
| Title Proper | Assessing the effectiveness of security assurances on the DPRK’s |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Shen, Dingli ; Ding, Yi |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s case of nuclear
proliferation, less attention has been paid to the role of security assurances. This
paper seeks to assess the role of security assurances for the DPRK provided by the
UN, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States and to figure out why these
assurances are less effective to bridle its nuclear ambition. It argues that an effective
security assurance for nuclear non-proliferation should meet at least two conditions.
Firstly the security assurance should be credible, which can be realized by being
publicized, legally binding, and infusing with further commitments. Secondly, the
security assurance tailored to the unique features of the target state’s concerns is
more likely to be effective. Using this set of criteria, the only moderately effective
assurance is that provided by the Soviet Union. The general security assurance
of the UN is neither legally binding nor specifically targeted. The alliance with
China exists only on paper as Pyongyang believes Beijing is reluctant to fulfill its
obligation as an ally. The United States is taking a capricious attitude on the DPRK
and none of its security assurances are legalized or address its major concern of
regime survival. These may help explain why security assurances failed to prevent
the DPRK from acquiring nuclear weapons. |
| `In' analytical Note | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol. 31, No.4; Dec 2019: p.575－593 |
| Journal Source | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol: 31 No 4 |
| Key Words | Nuclear Nonproliferation ; DPRK ; United States ; China ; Effectiveness ; Soviet Union ; Security Assuranc |