ID | 169872 |
Title Proper | Interaction effects of market failure and CRMs in interconnected electricity markets |
Language | ENG |
Author | Lorenczik, Stefan |
Summary / Abstract (Note) | European electricity markets are characterised by a multitude of (mainly national) approaches for ensuring security of supply. Although concerns regarding possible interaction effects between different market designs have been raised occasionally, the scientific research on capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRMs) primarily focusses on different design options in single markets. The research concerning possible spsill-over effects, positive or negative, in adjacent markets is lagging behind. This is the case for the effects of CRMs as well as for the effects of insufficient investment incentives. We address both topics in this paper. |
`In' analytical Note | Energy Policy , No.135;Dec 2019: p.110961 |
Journal Source | Energy Policy 2019-12 |
Key Words | Electricity Market Design ; Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms ; Cross-Border Effects |