| ID | 171342 |
| Title Proper | Strategic legislative subsidies |
| Other Title Information | informational lobbying and the cost of policy |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Ellis, Christopher J ; Groll, Thomas |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | We analyze the strategic considerations inherent in legislative subsidies and develop an informational lobbying model with costly policy reforms. In contrast to other models of informational lobbying, we focus on the implications of a policymaker’s and a lobby’s resource constraints for lobbying activities. We allow both a policymaker and a lobby to gather information, and each can either fund or subsidize policymaking. Our analysis highlights that legislative subsidies are both chosen strategically by lobbyists and strategically induced by policymakers, dependent on the circumstances. These involve which resource constraints bind the policymaker’s prior beliefs, the salience of policy, and the policymaker’s and lobby’s expertise in information gathering. Our results highlight five distinct motives for informational lobbying and demonstrate that for both a lobby and policymaker, there can be strategic advantages arising from being resource-constrained. |
| `In' analytical Note | American Political Science Review Vol. 114, No.1; Feb 2020: p.179-205 |
| Journal Source | American Political Science Review 2020-02 114, 1 |
| Key Words | Policymaker ; Policy Reforms ; Strategic Legislative Subsidies ; Informational Lobbying Model |