| ID | 171965 |
| Title Proper | Assembling cybersecurity |
| Other Title Information | the politics and materiality of technical malware reports and the case of Stuxnet |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Stevens, Clare |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This is an article about how cybersecurity gets “made,” with a focus on the role of commercial computer security firms in generating knowledge in matters of international cybersecurity. The argument is two-fold. Firstly, malware may be an intangible artefact in some ways, but its success and its interpretation as malware is deeply interwoven in social, technical, and material alliances. Secondly, a materialist-minded examination of Symantec’s Stuxnet reports will demonstrate the politically situated nature of how cybersecurity expertise emerges. The article finds that Symantec’s work was not a-political or neutrally-technical: Their experts made profoundly political choices in their analyses. By showing the processes that go into making cybersecurity, the article contributes to a widening and deepening of debates about what is at stake in cybersecurity knowledge and practices. |
| `In' analytical Note | Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 41, No.1; Jan 2020: p.129-152 |
| Journal Source | Contemporary Security Policy Vol: 41 No 1 |
| Key Words | Security Studies ; Cybersecurity ; Materiality ; Stuxnet ; Intangible Artifacts |