| ID | 172141 |
| Title Proper | On the calculus of counterterror policy |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Arce, Daniel G |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In democratic societies, elections can act as a referendum on politicians’ counterterror policy. At the same time, counterterror policy is conducted under conditions of asymmetric information because the government is better informed about the nature of the threat than is the public. Using a hybrid signaling model, this paper characterizes counterterror policy in terms of its instrumental efficacy against terrorists, and also non-instrumental considerations such as the electoral consequences of policy failures. In addition, the equilibria capture the difficulties that voters have in assessing the appropriateness of policy in the absence of terrorism. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 31, No.4; Jun 2020: p.387-399 |
| Journal Source | Defence and Peace Economics Vol: 31 No 4 |
| Key Words | Counter Terrorism ; Game Theory ; Information Transmission ; Signaling ; Overreaction |