| ID | 172887 |
| Title Proper | Political-Economic Foundations of Representative Government |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Narizny, Kevin |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The dominant interpretation of the Glorious Revolution portrays it as an innovative compromise that used clever institutional design to solve a coordination problem between rival elites. In contrast, I argue that it was neither innovative nor a compromise and that it was the product of structural change rather than institutional design. Following Barrington Moore, I focus on the rise of agrarian capitalism and economically autonomous elites, who, in contrast to rent-seeking elites, do not depend on favor from the state for their income. They have an interest in the creation of a political system that ensures their equal rights under the law, open access to markets, and opportunities to form broad coalitions against rent-seeking. This makes them a critical constituency for representative government. I test this argument through an analysis of patterns of allegiance for Crown and Parliament at the outset of the English Civil War and address its relevance to the Glorious Revolution. |
| `In' analytical Note | Perspectives on Politics Vol. 18, No.2; Jun 2020: p.454-469 |
| Journal Source | Perspectives on Politics 2020-06 18, 2 |
| Key Words | Representative government ; Political-Economic Foundations ; Glorious Revolution |