ID | 173161 |
Title Proper | Military confidence-building in crises: lessons from Georgia and Ukraine |
Language | ENG |
Author | Engvall, Johan |
Summary / Abstract (Note) | What role can conventional arms control (CAC) and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) play in crises and conflicts? By examining the use of CAC and CSBMs during the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and during Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the present article argue that CAC and CSBMs are unable to prevent intentional conflict. Their more realistic value in crises is to function as early warning mechanisms that raise the bar for and increase the costs of conflict as well as serving as instruments to monitor conflicts. To increase their effectiveness, the links between early warning and early action need strengthening and several ambiguities need to be removed, particularly form the Vienna Document, in order to improve indicators, increase warning times and raise the political costs of non-compliance. Nonetheless, when one or two sides seek a conflict, CAC and CSBMs do not provide a remedy for conflict prevention. |
`In' analytical Note | Defence Studies Vol. 20, No.3; Sep 2020: p.250-270 |
Journal Source | Defence Studies Vol: 20 No 3 |
Key Words | OSCE ; open Skies treaty ; CFE Treaty ; Russia ; Ukraine ; Georgia ; Confidence- and Security-Building Measures ; Conventional Arms Control ; Vienna Document |