| ID | 173245 |
| Title Proper | Strategic Command and Control in the Russian Armed Forces: Untangling the General Staff, Military Districts, and Service Main Commands (Part Three) |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Whisler, Greg |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article is the final in a series of three that examines the Russian Armed Forces’ efforts to adjust its strategic command and control architecture in the post-Soviet period, taking into account wide-ranging shifts in force structure, missions, geography, resources, and leadership. President Vladimir Putin somewhat abruptly installed a new leadership tandem at the Ministry of Defense in late 2012, prompting a backlash against the wrenching defense reforms of the preceding four years. The new strategic command and control system established during the reforms came under scrutiny, but Russian military leaders ultimately determined that with some relatively minor adjustments, the system was ideal. This relatively flat and well-organized strategic command and control system has already demonstrated its effectiveness in Ukraine and Syria. More broadly, the 20-year process of forming this system was one of the most important facets of Russia’s post-Soviet defense reform process and probably the most successful. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol. 33, No.2; Apr-Jun 2020: p.237-258 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol: 33 No 2 |
| Key Words | Strategic command and control ; Russian Armed Forces |