| ID | 173815 |
| Title Proper | Client gets a vote |
| Other Title Information | counterinsurgency warfare and the U.S. military advisory mission in South Vietnam, 1954-1965 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Hazelton, Jacqueline L |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The belief that U.S. military advisors in South Vietnam did not know how to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign underpins belief that reforms are necessary for counterinsurgency success. However, contemporaneous U.S. documents show that military officers in the advisory period, 1954–1965, believed in the need for reforms and pressed their South Vietnamese counterparts to implement them. If advisors urged their partners to liberalize and democratize, yet the state remained autocratic, repressive, and corrupt, what explains the South Vietnamese failure to reform? I identify the client state’s ability and will to resist reforms as an important overlooked element of counterinsurgency campaigns. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 43, No.1; Feb 2020: p.126-153 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol: 43 No 1 |
| Key Words | Counterinsurgency ; Military Intervention ; Vietnam ; Patron - Client Relations ; Great Power Military Intervention |