| ID | 173897 |
| Title Proper | Conditional effect of audiences on credibility |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Hauenstein, Matthew ; Matthew Hauenstein |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | How do leaders signal their intentions during a crisis? Scholars point to audience costs, potential political punishment for bluffing during bargaining, to explain how accountable leaders communicate. However, the empirical support for audience costs is mixed. I argue that this apparent disconnect between theory and evidence is due to different ways that audiences can threaten to use their sanctioning power during a crisis. When determining whether to punish a leader for a failed coercive threat, their domestic supporters should balance concerns over consistency and policy outcomes. As such, accountable leaders’ ability to credibly communicate is not automatic, rather it depends on their supporters’ policy preferences. I apply this insight using casualty sensitivity as a conditioning policy preference. I expect, and find, that audiences only help a leader commit to fight when fighting is low-cost, and actually prevent commitment when fighting is high-cost. Using compellent threat data, I find that audiences have countervailing effects on credibility due to their preferences for leaders who are both consistent and avoid costly conflict. This conditional effect could explain prior mixed support for audience costs in observational data, as prior studies pool together instances where I find audiences have strong, but opposing, effects. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Peace Research Vol. 57, No.3; May 2020: p.422-436 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Peace Research Vol: 57 No 3 |
| Key Words | Bargaining ; Audience Costs ; Coercion |