| ID | 174075 |
| Title Proper | Reconsidering lock-in effects and benefits from delegation |
| Other Title Information | the African Union’s relations with its member states through a principal–agent perspective |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Welz, Martin |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This paper explores the relations of the African Union (AU) with its member states through the lens of principal–agent theory. I consider the AU Commission—an international public administration—as an agent to which its member states—the principals—delegate authority. I show that core assumptions of principal–agent theory apply to the AU’s relations with its member states. These include that principals aim to keep control over their agent, that we find agents acting opportunistically, that principals sanction the agent if needed and that the heterogeneity of preferences amongst principals decreases the level of authority delegated to the agent. However, my analysis also suggests that principal–agent theory needs to broaden its understandings of lock-in effects and of the reasons why states limit their delegation of authority. |
| `In' analytical Note | Cambridge Review of International Affairs Vol. 33, No.2; Apr 2020: p.159-178 |
| Journal Source | Cambridge Review of International Affairs Vol: 33 No 2 |
| Key Words | African Union’s Relations ; Principal–agent Perspective |