| ID | 174626 |
| Title Proper | Stability amid Strategic Deregulation |
| Other Title Information | Managing the End of Nuclear Arms Control |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Trenin, Dmitri |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | That nuclear arms control is on the way out is no news. The unraveling of its Cold War-era architecture started almost two decades ago, when US President George W. Bush welcomed Vladimir Putin to his ranch at Crawford, Texas and told the then-young Russian leader that he intended to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The withdrawal from this 1972 treaty, which placed severe restrictions on both countries’ strategic defenses, was a severe blow to the Russians, who had long considered it a cornerstone of strategic stability. Bush, however, couldn’t care less. The Cold War was over, and several countries around the world were busy developing ballistic missiles that required US response. Russia was neither an adversary nor a close partner of the United States, and it was lying flat on its back. While Washington was pointing to North Korean and Iranian missile programs, Moscow suspected it was seeking strategic superiority over both Russia and China. |
| `In' analytical Note | Washington Quarterly Vol. 43, No.3; Fall 2020: p.161-175 |
| Journal Source | Washington Quarterly Vol: 43 No 3 |
| Key Words | Nuclear Arms Control ; Stability amid Strategic Deregulation |