| ID | 175333 |
| Title Proper | How and When Amnesty during Conflict Affects Conflict Termination |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Daniels, Lesley-Ann |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | n the difficult process of ending civil wars, granting amnesty during conflict is seen as a useful option, with an underpinning assumption that trading justice for peace is effective. However, is the case? This article tries to bring some clarity to when and how amnesty given during conflict has an impact. Amnesty should have different effects on diverse conflict endings: negotiated settlement, rebel victory, government victory, or conflict reduction. The article also disaggregates amnesties to test direct impacts as an incentive or through reducing the commitment problem, and indirect effects that give military advantage to the government. Using a cross-national data set of amnesties in dyadic conflicts from 1975 to 2011, the research finds that amnesty’s strongest effect is, surprisingly, not as an incentive but rather to reduce commitment problems. It can lead to negotiated settlements but also to government military advantage. The results have implications for negotiations and conflict resolution. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 64, No.9; Oct 2020: p.1612-1637 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol: 64 No 9 |
| Key Words | Conflict Termination ; Amnesty ; Bargaining ; Transitional Justice ; Commitment Problems ; Civil War |