| ID | 175502 |
| Title Proper | Proxy Wars & the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Konyukhovskiy, Pavel V ; Grigoriadis, Theocharis |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In this paper, we analyze the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by proposing a proxy war model, where conflict lasts longer, but it is less costly than direct military confrontation. In proxy wars, Nash equilibria are realizable, but not always sustainable in the long-run. The consolidation level of the double principal–agent relationship predicts the continuation of conflict and thus the emergence of peace. As our model suggests, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is likely to remain irresolvable, as long as the Palestinians do not have a principal that is willing to provide continuous and positive levels of conflict involvement. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 31, No.8; Dec 2020: p.904-926 |
| Journal Source | Defence and Peace EconomicsVol: 31 No 8 |
| Key Words | Palestine ; Israel ; Proxy Wars ; Non-Cooperative Games ; Principal-Agent Models |