| ID | 175689 |
| Title Proper | Israeli strategic deterrence doctrine and practice |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Bar, Shmuel |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Israel is the only country whose neighbors have threatened it for most of its existence with total eradication. Despite Israel’s military advantages, Israel’s defense doctrine views war as the “no choice option” which carries a heavy social and economic price tag. Therefore, Israeli doctrine relies heavily on the projection of deterrence. Events over the years have given rise to debates in the Israeli public regarding the “erosion” of Israeli deterrence. However, these debates are replete with fallacies. An understanding of Israeli deterrence doctrine must be based on the distinction between three national situation levels in the context of which deterrence must be achieved: “Routine”, “Emergency” and “War” and the role of “compellence” and pre-emption of offensive capabilities of the enemy as an instrument for inducing deterrence (“pre-terrence”). Ultimately, Israel has succeeded in maintaining strategic deterrence vis-à-vis neighboring states. This article provides an understanding of the evolution of Israel’s deterrence doctrine, its successes and its failures, and, mutatis mutandis, lessons that it can offer to deterrence doctrine in general and to that of the United States in particular. |
| `In' analytical Note | Comparative Strategy Vol. 39, No.1-6; 2020: p.321-353 |
| Journal Source | Comparative Strategy Vol: 39 No 1-6 |
| Key Words | Israeli Strategic Deterrence ; Doctrine and Practice |