| ID | 177064 |
| Title Proper | Obama administration and Syrian chemical weapons |
| Other Title Information | deterrence, compellence, and the limits of the “Resolve plus Bombs” formula |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Knopf, Jeffrey W ; Moran, Matthew ; Bowen, Wyn |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article examines responses to the Syrian government’s possession and eventual use of chemical weapons (CW) in that country’s civil war from 2012 to 2013. During this time, the United States and other outside powers applied coercive strategies, in both deterrent and compellent modes. Outcomes varied: compellence in the form of coercive diplomacy achieved a partial success, getting Syria to give up much of its chemical stockpile, but there were multiple deterrence failures, culminating in a large-scale sarin gas attack in August 2013. We examine this record to draw lessons about factors associated with the effectiveness of coercion. Our analysis draws on insights from existing research on both deterrence and coercive diplomacy to develop an integrated analytical framework involving the interplay of three factors: credibility, motivations, and assurance. We find the typical default approach to coercion, based on demonstrating toughness and threatening to impose costs using airpower—an approach we call the “resolve plus bombs” formula—was not sufficient to change Syria’s calculations regarding chemical use. |
| `In' analytical Note | Security Studies Vol. 29, No.5; Oct-Dec 2020: p. 797-831 |
| Journal Source | Security Studies Vol: 29 No 5 |
| Key Words | Deterrence ; United States ; Compellence ; Obama Administration ; Syrian Chemical Weapons |