| ID | 177069 |
| Title Proper | Strategic intelligence and international crisis behavior |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Matovski, Aleksandar |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | High-quality strategic intelligence is commonly considered to be a stabilizing factor in international relations, steadying decision making and preventing misunderstandings and surprise attacks. This paper challenges this view by arguing that deep intelligence penetrations are some of the most destabilizing forces in high-stakes security crises. By exposing the opponents’ weaknesses and avenues of attack, intelligence penetration not only provides its beneficiaries with a potentially decisive offensive capability but also compels them to use it quickly, before the breach is discovered and the advantage is gone. Also, as the intelligence target is generally unaware of this capability, it does not serve as a deterrent that might force the target to the bargaining table. Thus, paradoxically, opposing sides are more likely to find a peaceful solution to crises when they do not have extensive strategic intelligence on each other. |
| `In' analytical Note | Security Studies Vol. 29, No.5; Oct-Dec 2020: p. 964-990 |
| Journal Source | Security Studies Vol: 29 No 5 |
| Key Words | Intelligence ; Strategic Intelligence ; Bargaining ; International Crisis Behavior |