| ID | 177189 |
| Title Proper | Radicalism in Mass Movements |
| Other Title Information | Asymmetric Information and Endogenous Leadership |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | WING SUEN ; Suen, Wing ; Chen, Heng |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Asymmetric information and diverse preferences for reform create an agency problem between opposition leaders and citizens. Dissatisfied citizens are unsure of how bad the current situation is but infer this information from the scale of the leader’s reform proposal. Because radical leaders have an incentive to exaggerate and mislead, to command credibility, they must paradoxically radicalize the proposal further as a way of signaling the necessity of change. Radicalism motivated by signaling is costly, as it reduces a movement’s chances of success. This mechanism also contributes to leadership radicalization when the leaders of movements arise as a compromise among diverse interests. |
| `In' analytical Note | American Political Science Review Vol. 115, No.1; Feb 2021: p.286 - 306 |
| Journal Source | American Political Science Review 2021-03 115, 1 |
| Key Words | Radicalism ; Asymmetric Information ; Mass Movements ; Endogenous Leadership |