| ID | 178326 |
| Title Proper | Anti-mercenary norm and the market for combat force |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Petersohn, Ulrich |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Since 2013, combat services have been increasingly exchanged on the market. This development is puzzling since the practice emerged despite an anti-mercenary norm banning such services, and without any revision of the norm. The article argues that the combat market is not a deliberate design, but the result of strategic interaction. For some, compliance with the anti-mercenary norm is the best strategy, while for others, violating the norm is best. However, once the norm violation occurs, it is in the interest of all actors to maintain a façade of compliance. Non-compliant actors benefit from the combat services, and compliant actors do not have to engage in costly sanctioning of the norm violation, and avoid the reputational costs associated with non-enforcement. The article employs game theory to investigate the strategic interactions of actors across eleven combat contracts from 2013 to 2019. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Journal Vol. 76, No.1; Mar 2021: p.106–128 |
| Journal Source | International Journal Vol: 76 No 1 |
| Key Words | Game Theory ; International Norms ; Market For Force ; Private Military and Security Company ; Anti - Mercenary Norm |