| ID | 178997 |
| Title Proper | Four Costly Signaling Mechanisms |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Quek, Kai |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Two mechanisms of costly signaling are known in international relations: sinking costs and tying hands. I show that there exist four mechanisms of costly signaling that are equally general. I develop the new mechanisms of installment costs and reducible costs and contrast them with sunk costs and tied-hands costs. I then conduct experiments to test the four signaling mechanisms. I find that each mechanism can improve credibility when the costs are high, but reducible costs can improve credibility even when the costs are low. |
| `In' analytical Note | American Political Science Review Vol. 115, No.2; May 2021: p.537 - 549 |
| Journal Source | American Political Science Review 2021-06 115, 2 |
| Key Words | Costly Signaling Mechanisms |