| ID | 179164 |
| Title Proper | Hobbling Big Brother |
| Other Title Information | Top-Level Design and Local Discretion in China’s Social Credit System |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Tsai, Wen-Hsuan ; Lin, Ruihua ; Wang, Hsin-Hsien |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article argues that policy implementation in China has moved toward a system under which the center formulates a blueprint or “top-level design” from which local officials devise detailed regulations through a process of “crossing the river by feeling for stones.” This applies to the development of China’s new social credit system. To minimize political risk, when implementing it local officials have selected easier goals from the “top-level design” blueprint. In City Z, for example, we find that promoting integrity among businesses is less risky than promoting integrity among civil servants or the general public, so less progress has been made in the latter two areas when putting in place integrity credit-point systems. The risks involved in promoting social credit among the general populace are the greatest, so the city’s efforts in this have been limited. From our empirical study of China’s social credit system in City Z, we draw some conclusions about policy implementation under Xi Jinping. |
| `In' analytical Note | China Journal ,No. 86; Jul 2021: p.1-20 |
| Journal Source | China Journal No 86 |
| Key Words | China ; Policy Implementation ; Top-Level Design ; Local Discretion ; China’s Social Credit System |