| ID | 180457 |
| Title Proper | Was Airpower “Misapplied” in the Vietnam War? reassessing Signaling in Operation Rolling Thunder |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Gurantz, Ron |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Operation Rolling Thunder’s failure has been widely blamed on the strategy of using force to send “signals.” It discredited the associated theory of coercion among a generation of military officers and scholars. In this paper I show that, whatever its other failures, Operation Rolling Thunder did successfully signal a threat. I rely on the latest research to demonstrate that Hanoi believed the bombing would eventually inflict massive destruction. I also show that Washington accurately ascribed the failure of the threat to North Vietnam’s resolve and continued the operation for reasons other than signaling. These findings show that Operation Rolling Thunder can be productively understood as an exercise in both signaling and countersignaling. Rather than discrediting the theory of coercion, these findings modify it. They show that failed threats can be informative and that coercive campaigns can become prolonged for reasons other than a lack of credibility. |
| `In' analytical Note | Security Studies Vol. 30, No.2; Apr-May 2021: p.245-270 |
| Journal Source | Security Studies Vol: 30 No 2 |
| Key Words | Vietnam War ; Airpower ; Operation Rolling Thunder |