| ID | 180672 |
| Title Proper | Reputations for resolve and higher-order beliefs in crisis bargaining |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Dafoe, Allan ; Zwetsloot, Remco ; Cebul, Matthew |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Reputations for resolve are said to be one of the few things worth fighting for, yet they remain inadequately understood. Discussions of reputation focus almost exclusively on first-order belief change—A stands firm, B updates its beliefs about A’s resolve. Such first-order reputational effects are important, but they are not the whole story. Higher-order beliefs—what A believes about B’s beliefs, and so on—matter a great deal as well. When A comes to believe that B is more resolved, this may decrease A’s resolve, and this in turn may increase B’s resolve, and so on. In other words, resolve is interdependent. We offer a framework for estimating higher-order effects, and find evidence of such reasoning in a survey experiment on quasi-elites. Our findings indicate both that states and leaders can develop potent reputations for resolve, and that higher-order beliefs are often responsible for a large proportion of these effects (40 percent to 70 percent in our experimental setting). We conclude by complementing the survey with qualitative evidence and laying the groundwork for future research. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 65, No.7-8; Aug-Sep 2021: p.1378–1404 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol: 65 No 7-8 |
| Key Words | Conflict ; Game Theory ; Bargaining ; Belief Structure ; Survey Experiment |