| ID | 181206 |
| Title Proper | Deflection of strategy by politics |
| Other Title Information | British grand strategy, a German Island and the Dardanelles debacle |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Lambert, Andrew |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | For much of the past century discussions of British strategy between the 1880s and 1914 have been dominated by a tendency to focus on explaining what happened after August 1914, assuming the strategic thinking of British governments was in any way comparable to operational level focus of mass army operations directed at terrestrial borders and concluding that the Army had in some way ‘won’ the strategic debate, in 1911, or August 1914. This model derived considerable support from the post-war writings of Winston Churchill who, in the process of explaining his own controversial decisions, failed to reflect the reality of naval planning. The land focused, army-led model was contested between the wars, but once the British Army on the Rhine, on NATO’s ‘Central Front’, became the cornerstone of national policy it lent a curious validation to the idea that the military discussions of the pre-1914 Anglo-French Entente had represented a similar ‘commitment’. Furthermore NATO’s naval needs were restricted to the distinctly secondary ‘Flank’ or ‘Out of Area’ regions. These three important new books provide an opportunity to revisit the debate three decades after the end of the Cold War, when NATO has been operating as a global expeditionary force, rather than a conventional barrier shielding Western Europe. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 44, No.5; Oct 2021: p.760-773 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol: 44 No 5 |