| ID | 182004 |
| Title Proper | Colin S. Gray, deterrence, and contingency |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Milevski, Lukas |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Most scholars as well as practitioners in strategic studies recognize that deterrence is contingent upon the opponent choosing to be deterred. This recognition was a contribution made by Colin Gray to deterrence theory, forcefully if not strictly uniquely, on the basis of the theory of strategy. Although relating the nature of strategy to deterrence led to a powerful reinterpretation of the importance of actor agency in deterrence, it is nonetheless still an incomplete, albeit foundational, appreciation of agency and contingency. To understand fully the role of agency in deterrence, one must also relate it to the nature of political relationships, and thereby identify another contingency point in deterrence. |
| `In' analytical Note | Comparative Strategy Vol. 40, No.1-6; 2021: p.145-149 |
| Journal Source | Comparative Strategy Vol: 40 No 1-6 |
| Key Words | Deterrence ; Contingency ; Colin S. Gray |