| ID | 182020 |
| Title Proper | Winning the Gray Zone: The importance of intermediate force capabilities in implementing the National Defense Strategy |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Leimbach Jr., Wendell B ; Levine, Susan D |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | While the United States must always be ready to prevail during a high-end conflict --and overwhelming lethality represents a significant deterrent to conflict in the first place --the Nation must also be able to overwhelmingly compete and deter activity short of traditional armed conflict. In the language of emerging Joint Doctrine, this is known as the “Competition Below Armed Conflict” portion of the “Competition Continuum.” It is also referred to as the Gray Zone, Hybrid Warfare or Irregular Warfare. Winning in the Gray Zone means completing the “deterrence equation,” that is, precluding adversary aggression in competition below armed conflict with intermediate force capabilities (IFCs) in a manner similar to equipping the U.S. military element of national power with overwhelming lethality as a deterrent to armed conflict. IFCs, which include non-lethal weapons as well as other non-lethal tools, will bridge the gap that exists between a mission of mere presence and the use of lethal effects. These capabilities allow active measures when presence alone is insufficient to deter malign activities or when the use of lethal or destructive force is neither desired nor appropriate. The addition of IFCs to the Joint Force’s toolkit will help the Services maintain a decisive advantage over strategic competitors, in addition to the lethal force that is the hallmark of the U.S. military. |
| `In' analytical Note | Comparative Strategy Vol. 40, No.1-6; 2021: p.223-234 |
| Journal Source | Comparative Strategy Vol: 40 No 1-6 |
| Key Words | Irregular Warfare ; Gray Zone ; Hybrid Warfare ; National Defense Strategy ; U.S. Military Element |