| ID | 182592 |
| Title Proper | Presidents and the conditional core-swing targeting of the national subsidy in South Korea, 1989–2018 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kim, Wooseok |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In this article, I present a theory of conditional core-swing targeting that focuses on the competition for majority control in legislative elections to explain how presidents use their strong budgetary powers to manipulate the distribution of the national subsidy in South Korea. Presidents whose parties already possess a legislative majority are expected to favor core municipalities to strengthen the foundations of their majority constituency, whereas those who seek majority control are predicted to prioritize swing municipalities in an effort to cross the majority threshold. Presidents are also anticipated to respond to the electoral cycle by shifting subsidies to riskier municipalities when elections approach. Using a novel data set on national subsidy allocations that spans three decades, I find evidence in favor of the hypotheses. This article demonstrates that the beneficiaries of distributive favoritism are not fixed, and that politicians can engage in complex and varied targeting strategies to achieve their objectives. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of East Asian Studies Vol. 21, No.3; Nov 2021: p.477 - 497 |
| Journal Source | Journal of East Asian Studies Vol: 21 No 3 |
| Key Words | South Korea ; Presidents ; Legislative Elections ; Distributive Politics ; Pork Barrel |