| ID | 182766 |
| Title Proper | Reciprocity information and wage personalization |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Zheng, Kaiming ; Wang, Xiaoyuan ; Ni, Debing |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This paper considers a modified principal-agent environment, where principals can use personalized offers based on agents' reciprocity-related information. With such information, principals can either impose stronger financial incentives or try to “trigger” agents' positive reciprocity by offering a higher fixed rate. Theory suggests that principals who believe in agents' reciprocity would personalize offers so that reciprocal agents increase their effort beyond the self-regarding benchmark. Using a lab experiment, we test the behavior of principals and agents. Our experimental market witnesses significant wage personalization when reciprocity information is available. However, agents' effort levels and principals' payoffs are lower under wage personalization, compared with the sessions where principals cannot personalize offers. Our structural analysis shows that, under wage personalization, agents expect higher fixed wages and reciprocate higher wages less. Information about agents' individual reciprocity is more correlated with the expected wages, rather than the strength of reciprocity toward higher or lower wages. Principals grant higher fixed wages to workers with lower wage expectations, but because principals cannot personalize offers effectively according to the strength of reciprocity, the performance of wage personalization is limited. |
| `In' analytical Note | China Economic Review Vol. 68, Aug 2021: p.101645 |
| Journal Source | China Economic Review 2021-07 68, 68 |
| Key Words | Reciprocity ; Moral hazard ; Contract ; Personalization ; Reference Point |