| ID | 183450 |
| Title Proper | Informal ties in Japanese bureaucracy |
| Other Title Information | a challenge to legalism and impersonalism |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | GRAFOV, Dmitry |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article analyzes the informal system of relations in Japan (Jinmyaku). Its essence is collective loyalty, and it serves as the basis of the practice of transferring Amakudari (retired officials) to top positions in the corporations and companies that they regulated while serving in government ministries. It is believed that Amakudari allowed government to run the businesses most efficiently and were one factor of the Japanese economic miracle. However, after a series of scandals in the 1990s, attitudes toward this practice began to change, and it was increasingly associated with corruption. In 2008, the National Civil Service Act banned officials from working in companies with which they had contacts while working in civil service for two years after leaving their post. Exceptions were possible only with the consent of the National Personnel Office. But the Amakudari practice continued unofficially and still exists today. |
| `In' analytical Note | Far Eastern Affairs Vol. 49, No.3; 2021: p.83-99 |
| Journal Source | Far Eastern Affairs Vol: 49 No 3 |
| Key Words | Corruption ; Network Connections ; Amakudari ; Jinmyaku ; Informal Connections ; Retired Officials ; Group Loyalty ; Interpersonal Relationships. |