| ID | 183950 |
| Title Proper | Nixon Doctrine and the Making of Authoritarianism in Island Southeast Asia |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Fibiger, Mattias |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | President Richard Nixon arrived on the Pacific island of Guam in the late afternoon of July 25, 1969. Only hours after witnessing the splashdown of the Apollo XI spacecraft, Nixon spoke to reporters and articulated what came to be known as the Nixon Doctrine. The president focused his remarks on the need for a post-Vietnam War framework for American involvement in Asia. He argued that geography and history had fashioned of the United States a Pacific power, one whose interests and responsibilities stretched far beyond its western shores. And a Pacific power it would remain. Only the United States, Nixon insisted, could deter aggression by communist states like China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. But the president went on to explain that changes on both sides of the Pacific demanded a new American strategy. In the United States, the “frustration” wrought by the Vietnam War imposed limits on Americans’ willingness to bear the burdens of the defense of freedom abroad. Meanwhile across the Pacific, nationalist consolidation and economic development had rendered Asia far more secure, and the region’s people “no longer want to be dictated to from the outside.”1 These new circumstances, Nixon concluded, demanded a new policy: the United States would continue to furnish its Asian allies with the military and economic aid—but no longer the manpower—necessary to subdue threats that arose within their national borders. |
| `In' analytical Note | Diplomatic History Vol. 45, No.5; Nov 2021: p.954–982 |
| Journal Source | Diplomatic History Vol: 45 No 5 |
| Key Words | Nixon Doctrine ; Authoritarianism in Island Southeast Asia |