| ID | 184086 |
| Title Proper | Policy implementation strategies of county cadres |
| Other Title Information | political instrument and flexible local governance |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Tsai, Wen-Hsuan ; Tian, Gang |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Using the concept of ‘hedging’, we explore how local cadres in China deviate from central policies in order to serve local interests and, while doing so, avoid being called to account by their superiors. Political signals enable cadres to decide when to invest more resources into the implementation of certain policies. In this way, they optimize their performance and avoid the political risks involved in failing to carry out their designated tasks. This article uses county Y as an example in a discussion of county-level implementation of policies related to economic growth and air pollution control. We find that local cadres weaken the functions of the superior ‘special inspection team’ (专项督察组, hereafter inspection team), treating them as political instruments used by the central and local authorities to ensure a greater level of responsiveness at the grass roots. Information concerning the imminent arrival of an inspection team in their locality acts as a signal for cadres to allocate more resources to the enforcement of air pollution control measures, thus maximizing their performance in this area. Through this research, we have endeavoured to provide a deeper understanding of the operating logic of Chinese local governments and the behaviour of county cadres. |
| `In' analytical Note | China Information Vol. 36, No.1; Mar 2022: p.23-45 |
| Journal Source | China Information 2022-04 36, 1 |
| Key Words | Air Pollution Control ; Policy Responsiveness ; Cadre Management ; Hedger ; Special Inspection Team |