| ID | 184760 |
| Title Proper | Law Production in Multiparty Presidentialism |
| Other Title Information | Veto Player Theory and its Application to Korea |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Moon, Woojin |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In this article, I offer a theory of lawmaking in multiparty presidential systems with different legislative institutions. I present a model that combines Krehbiel's pivotal politics theory with Tsebelis's veto players theory. This model simplifies various institutional veto players into the de facto veto players. I analyze the model to explain how the government type (unified versus divided governments), the legislative rules (majoritarian versus supermajoritarian rules), and the party system (two-party versus multiparty systems) affect legislative productivity. I apply the theoretical results obtained to solve the puzzle about the nondifferential legislative performance between unified and divided governments in the National Assembly. I test a hypothesis stating that the distance between the ideological positions of the agenda-setter and the de facto veto players has a negative effect on the proportion of controversial bills enacted between the 16th and the early 21st National Assemblies. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of East Asian Studies Vol. 22, No.1; Mar 2022: p.125 - 145 |
| Journal Source | Journal of East Asian Studies Vol: 22 No 1 |
| Key Words | Party System ; Veto Player Theory ; law production ; government types ; legislative rules ; multiparty presidentialism |