| ID | 184776 |
| Title Proper | Delegating strategic decision-making to machines |
| Other Title Information | Dr. Strangelove Redux? |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Johnson, James |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Will the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in strategic decision-making be stabilizing or destabilizing? What are the risks and trade-offs of pre-delegating military force to machines? How might non-nuclear state and non-state actors leverage AI to put pressure on nuclear states? This article analyzes the impact of strategic stability of the use of AI in the strategic decision-making process, in particular, the risks and trade-offs of pre-delegating military force (or automating escalation) to machines. It argues that AI-enabled decision support tools - by substituting the role of human critical thinking, empathy, creativity, and intuition in the strategic decision-making process - will be fundamentally destabilizing if defense planners come to view AI’s ‘support’ function as a panacea for the cognitive fallibilities of human analysis and decision-making. The article also considers the nefarious use of AIenhanced fake news, deepfakes, bots, and other forms of social media by non-state actors and state proxy actors, which might cause states to exaggerate a threat from ambiguous or manipulated information, increasing instability. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 45, No.3; Jun 2022: p.439-477 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol: 45 No 3 |
| Key Words | Nuclear Security ; Artificial Intelligence ; U.S.-China Relations ; Strategic Stability ; Deterrence Policye ; Merging Technology |