Item Details
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:506Hits:19968437Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

In Basket
  Journal Article   Journal Article
 

ID186128
Title ProperGreek Views of the 2015 Bailout Agreement
Other Title Informationa Matter of Power Asymmetries or Socialisation?
LanguageENG
AuthorKarakasis, Vasileios P
Summary / Abstract (Note)In July 2015, after intense negotiations with its creditors, Greece received a bailout in exchange for fiscal restraint. The coalition government at that time, led by the left-wing SYRIZA party, elected on the basis of an anti-austerity platform, eventually accepted the prevalent austerity frames of the creditors. Through the aid of Q-method, an analysis of Greek opinion leaders’ views of the negotiation highlights that this outcome can be explained in two different ways. The first posits that the ideological overtones that ruling SYRIZA injected in its negotiation strategy exhibited a lack of socialisation and undermined Greece’s already weak bargaining position. The second focuses on the institutional status quo bias in the Eurogroup in Germany’s favour, which discourages any change in the Eurozone. These two views may have partly been influenced by questions of political accountability.
`In' analytical NoteInternational Spectator Vol. 57, No.2; Jun 2022: p.103-121
Journal SourceInternational Spectator Vol: 57 No 2
Key WordsGreece ;  Socialisation ;  Rational Choice Institutionalism ;  Bailout Agreements ;  Q-methodology


 
 
Media / Other Links  Full Text