| ID | 186385 |
| Title Proper | From oligarchs to oligarchy |
| Other Title Information | the Failure of U.S. Sanctions on Russia and its Implications for Theories of Informal Politics |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Siegel, David |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Drawing heavily on theories about Russia's informal politics, American sanctions were designed to change Russian foreign policy by exploiting political conflict among oligarchs and the state elite; however, after nearly eight years of sanctions, Russian elites seem more united than ever. I propose that Russia's oligarchs—the ruthless self-interested economic elite in Russia's informal political system—might sometimes act as a cohesive oligarchy, particularly when their wealth is threatened from external rather than domestic sources, as has been the case under Western sanctions. Through an in-depth case study on the design and outcome of sanctions, this article seeks to develop a more dynamic theory of Russia's informal politics and explain the apparent cohesion among state and economic elites since 2014 as the result of a politics of wealth defense induced by Western sanctions. |
| `In' analytical Note | World Affairs US Vol. 185, No.2; Summer 2022: p.249-284 |
| Journal Source | World Affairs US Vol: 185 No 2 |
| Key Words | Sanctions ; United States ; Oligarchy ; Russian Foreign Policy ; Informal Politics ; Policy Theory ; U.S.-Russian Relations |