| ID | 186900 |
| Title Proper | Signalling capacity and crisis diplomacy |
| Other Title Information | Explaining the failure of ‘maximum pressure’ in the 2017 U.S.-North Korea nuclear crisis |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Bakich, Spencer D |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In the 2017 U.S.-North Korea nuclear crisis, the Trump administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ strategy failed to achieve its objectives of the complete, irreversible, verifiable denuclearization (CVID) of the DPRK, and induced escalation pressures that brought the two countries to the brink of war. A deficit in signalling capacity (i.e. biased intelligence portfolio, lack of diplomatic-military integration, and inflexible military doctrine and war plans) prevented Washington from managing the crisis, creating the conditions for its strategic failure. The signalling capacity framework offers a comprehensive approach to explaining the outcome of the 2017 crisis, outperforming audience cost and brinkmanship theories. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 45, No.5; Oct 2022: p.692-717 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol: 45 No 5 |
| Key Words | Nuclear Weapons ; United States ; North Korea ; Coercive Diplomacy ; Audience Costs ; Brinkmanship ; Signalling |